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Abstract—This article advances a novel account of ad hominem criminalisation
that draws upon a distinct theory of the Rule of Law and its egalitarian foundations.
Employing the recent and controversial example of Knife Crime Prevention Orders,
as established by the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, it argues that the concept of
civic equality is central to understanding the vice of ad hominem criminalisation as
an aberrant form of government by law. This vice consists in the manner that such
criminalisation individualises, differentiates and instrumentalises the regulatory sub-
ject, placing them outwith the bounds of civic equality as established by the Rule of
Law.
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1. Introduction
This article advances a novel theory of ad hominem criminalisation, which
builds upon the typical definition of that phenomenon as the creation of new
criminal offences targeted at distinct individuals or groups, rather than at soci-
ety as a whole.1 It makes two primary contributions: first, it argues that ad
hominem criminal legislation undermines government by law as a distinct type
of political association by violating the ‘civic equality’ that the Rule of Law
exists to protect. Second—and this may run contrary to the intuitions of some
lawyers—it contends that many of the most insidious instances of ad hominem
criminalisation are implicit, appearing in legislation that, on its face, appears
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sufficiently general to be Rule of Law compliant. These two insights matter
not only because they represent significant advances within the legal theory,
but also because they help diagnose important social injustices. To demon-
strate this point, and to provide our account of ad hominem criminalisation
with concrete illustration, we examine sections 14 and 21 of the Offensive
Weapons Act 2019, which empower courts to impose Knife Crime Prevention
Orders (KPCOs) on individuals without the need for criminal conviction.
Notwithstanding their general language, we argue that these provisions create
an ad hominem criminal regime when read, as they must be, in light of the so-
cial context within which they are to operate.
Standard accounts of ad hominem criminalisation characteristically present
that phenomenon in terms of explicit discrimination: ad hominem legislation
singles out, in a manner that is plain to see, some individual or group who is
to receive differential treatment under the criminal law.2 The classic illustra-
tion of this position is Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).3 In that
case, the High Court of Australia upheld Kable’s challenge to the legality of
an order made against him in compliance with the Community Protection Act
1994, enacted by the Parliament of New South Wales. The 1994 Act targeted
Kable by name (sections 3 and 5) and, in effect, compelled the Courts of
New South Wales to make a sui generis detention order against him. As con-
vincingly argued by Allan, the rationale for the decision in Kable must be
understood in terms of the separation of powers: ‘the separation of judicial
power and fundamental status of the ordinary judicial process, as precepts in-
trinsic to the rule of law, is inconsistent with unfettered power of arbitrary ac-
tion [by] the legislature’.4 Furthermore, the importance of the separation of
powers in this context lies downstream from the duties that courts have to
‘uphold the dignity and independence of the citizen’.5
Whilst we agree with Allan’s analysis of Kable as a commonly accepted in-
stance of ad hominem criminalisation, we do not believe he goes far enough.
According to him, ‘there is no insuperable objection to the making of deten-
tion orders by courts outside their ordinary function of sentencing convicted
offenders . . . [provided that] such detention [is authorised] in general terms,
in principle applicable to all’.6 Our objection is that even legislation couched
in general terms may, through the implicit targeting of particular individuals or
groups, undermine the civic equality that grounds the Rule of Law. It is for
this reason that our more expansive account of ad hominem criminalisation has
been developed.
Our argument begins by articulating the Rule of Law’s egalitarian founda-
tions, upon which our theory is constructed (section 2). Having done so, we
2 ibid.
3 (1996) 138 ALR 577.
4 Allan (n 1) 238.
5 ibid 237.
6 ibid.






/ojls/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqab041/6485162 by guest on 07 January 2022
present our definition of ad hominem criminalisation, which conceptualises this
problematic form of regulation as one that, through the use of individualised
control, either explicitly or implicitly differentiates between the status of (i)
particular individuals or groups and (ii) society at large, in such a way as to
instrumentalise the treatment of the former for the benefit of the latter (sec-
tion 3). What may seem counterintuitive, but nonetheless supplies our ap-
proach with analytical potency, is the manner in which we say that the
relevant implication should be ascertained. Rather than relying only upon the
text of the relevant statute(s), or even that text in combination with considera-
tions of general principle, we contend that close attention must be paid to the
broader sociolegal context within which the relevant legislation either is or is
likely to be applied. We illustrate this distinct approach through a critical ana-
lysis of the KCPO provisions in the 2019 Act, which we say, notwithstanding
their seemingly general form, perfectly exemplify the distinct combination of
individualisation, differentiation and instrumentalisation that constitutes ad
hominem criminalisation (section 4). As we shall see, one radical implication of
this approach is that the category ‘ad hominem criminalisation’ is far broader
than has been traditionally conceived.
2. The Rule of Law and Civic Equality
Following Allan (and others), we contend that the most instructive way to
characterise the distinct wrongfulness of ad hominem criminalisation is to at-
tend the ways in which it violates the Rule of Law. As such, the natural place
to begin our analysis is with what we take the latter concept to entail. The
Rule of Law is a complex and essentially contested concept.7 In what follows,
we outline a distinct account of its egalitarian foundations that captures the
idea that communities who govern themselves in accordance with law thereby
institute ‘civic equality’. To explain the conception of civic equality we have in
mind, this section will proceed as follows. First, we distinguish the ‘vertical di-
mension’ of the Rule of Law, which concerns the relationship between citizens
and the state, from its ‘horizontal dimension’, which concerns the relationship
between citizens. Second, we argue that the Rule of Law’s horizontal dimension
is concerned with the equal status of citizens as legal subjects. Third, we fur-
ther delineate such status-based equality by contrasting it with other (con-
nected but distinct) egalitarian considerations, which we examine through the
notion of unequal laws. Fourth and finally, we detail the unique (and morally
complex) place that contemporary criminal justice holds within a theory of the
Rule of Law conceived in these substantively egalitarian terms.
7 WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167.
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A. The Two Dimensions of the Rule of Law
The Rule of Law has both horizontal and vertical dimensions.8 Vertically, it
regulates the relationship between citizens and the state, requiring that ‘force
not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view,
no matter how beneficial or noble those ends, except as licensed and required
by . . . past political decisions about when collective force is justified’.9 This
emphasis upon legality as ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules’ represents perhaps the most generally accepted aspect of
the Rule of Law.10 It not only appears in the work of Dworkin and Fuller (just
quoted), but also in that of Finnis,11 Hayek,12 MacCormick,13 Raz14 and
Waldron,15 to list but a few. According to this tradition, law functions as a
limitation upon arbitrary power, in that it forbids fully discretionary decision
making by government officials.16 In what follows, we build upon this insight,
although we remain agnostic as to whether the vertical restrictions that the
Rule of Law imposes are purely formal and procedural, or whether they also
include more substantive protections.17 As a minimum, we take these restric-
tions to include Fuller’s eight principles of legality, which hold that laws must
be: (1) sufficiently general; (2) publicly promulgated; (3) prospective; (4) suffi-
ciently intelligible; (5) non-contradictory; (6) relatively constant; (7) possible
to obey; and (8) administered consistently with their apparent meaning.18
Following Raz, we accept that these vertical safeguards not only restrict arbi-
trary decision making, but also enable personal autonomy by facilitating indi-
vidual planning.19 Nonetheless, what interests us here is not so much
autonomy as equality and the ways in which the latter concept can be instanti-
ated by law.
This brings us to the Rule of Law’s horizontal dimension, which concerns
the particular ‘mode of association’ that government establishes by law within
a political community.20 We expand upon the egalitarian nature of this associ-
ation in the following subsection, but it might be briefly stated as follows: by
living within communities regulated in accordance with a common set of
standards, individuals within those communities are treated as fundamentally
8 Gerald Postema, ‘Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth’ in Lisa M Austin and Dennis Klimchuck (eds),
Private Law and the Rule of Law (OUP 2014) 19–20.
9 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana Press 1986) 93.
10 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale UP 1969) 130.
11 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (OUP 2011) 270–6.
12 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge Press 1944) 54.
13 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (OUP 2005) 12.
14 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979) 212.
15 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Ga L Rev 1, 6.
16 Raz (n 14) 219–20.
17 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2010) 66–8.
18 Fuller (n 10) 46–91.
19 Raz (n 14) 220.
20 Postema (n 8) 17.
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equal in status to those they live alongside.21 The horizontal dimension of the
Rule of Law secures this equality by requiring of everyone an attitude that has
sometimes been called ‘fidelity’: one of respect, which recognises and values
the fact that this community is a community of laws.22 As defined by Postema,
fidelity entails that everyone—that is, not just public officials, but also private
individuals—takes an active role in holding each other to account under those
same standards that, vertically speaking, constrain governmental power.23
Such a community is one in which a people have defined themselves, at least
in part, in terms of their mutual and reciprocal adherence to one set of govern-
ing standards. They have, to put matters in Arendtian parlance, ‘produced
equality by organisation’, even though it be equality of a very particular and
limited kind.24 Our concern, which we expand upon in what follows, is that
certain kinds of governmental activity can undermine the status-based equality
instantiated by the horizontal dimension of the Rule of Law and so violate the
social contract implicit in this valuable mode of association.25 In this article,
our chief concern is ad hominem criminalisation—exemplified (for us) by the
Offensive Weapons Act 2019 and its creation of KCPOs—as a practice deeply
at odds with the kind of civic equality that underpins government by law.26
B. Communities of Law and Civic Equality
In this subsection, we detail the Rule of Law’s egalitarian foundations. As
noted above, our core claim at this stage is that a community with the Rule of
Law is one in which a particular kind of status-based equality has been insti-
tuted. The status in question is one of civic equality and turns on mutual rec-
ognition, both of personhood and of a shared identity as part of ‘the people’
who collectively constitute the relevant political community.27 Such recogni-
tion picks out the individuals concerned, to paraphrase Nagel, as occupying a
certain sort of ‘place’ within that community’s normative landscape.28
Civic equality, which for present purposes we define as equal subjection to a
single set of governing principles, need not be particularly ‘thick’ and may
well admit, for example, significant socio-economic inequality. However, it
21 Dworkin (n 9) 200, 213–14.
22 Lon Fuller, ‘Postivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1957) 71 Harv L Rev 630.
23 Postema (n 8) 21.
24 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Meridian Books 1958) 301.
25 It is immaterial for present purposes whether this basic equality is ‘natural’ in the sense that the rule of
law simply recognises the fundamental equality of all human beings, or whether it is constructed, in the sense of
arising from the act of political association. For more on these two ways of understanding basic equality, see
Jeremy Waldron, One Another’s Equals. The Basis of Human Equality (Belknap Press 2017) 50–61.
26 Jennifer Hendry, ‘“The Usual Suspects”: Knife Crime Prevention Orders & the “Difficult” Regulatory
Subject’ (2021) Brit J Criminol <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azab063>.
27 RA Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart Publishing 2009) 43–56; Jo Shaw, The People in Question: Citizens and
Constitutions in Uncertain Times (Bristol UP 2020) 79, 155.
28 Thomas Nagel, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’ (1995) 24(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 83, 85.
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does require that there be no ‘thumb on the scale’ when it comes to how par-
ticular individuals should be treated, or how they are expected to behave.29 To
be fully respected as equal members of a community constituted by law, each
citizen must be both protected by and held accountable to the same set of
governing principles.30 In horizontal terms, this requires that all citizens dem-
onstrate ‘faithfulness . . . to each other with respect to some common govern-
ing norms’.31 Any individual who violates those common standards without
appropriate justification will implicitly disrespect and, in extreme cases, active-
ly undermine civic equality.32
Claims of this kind, while perhaps less widespread in contemporary philoso-
phy than those dealing with the vertical dimension of the Rule of Law, have
considerable pedigree. Rousseau, for example, famously argued that laws
properly so called—which is to say, those created in compliance with popular
sovereignty—must address the public as a whole, rather than particular individ-
uals or subgroups.33 On this view, any legislation that is not ‘general’ cannot
truly be said to govern a community of collectively sovereign equals.34 Indeed,
Rousseau went so far as to suggest that such partial directives cannot really be
considered law at all.35 Although we make no commitments as far as this
more extreme claim is concerned, we accept a broadly Rousseauian view of
the relationship between civic equality and the Rule of Law. Specifically, we
contend that any directive that picks out particular individuals or subgroups as
fundamentally different vis-à-vis their basic status as citizens, and thereby
denies their civic equality, is at odds with the values that underpin the hori-
zontal dimension of the Rule of Law.36 As such, laws of this kind constitute
aberrant examples of law as an ideal type, even though they might be sound
qua law in all other respects: that is, not only legally valid, but also clear, pro-
spective, stable and so on.37 In this respect, we are in fundamental disagree-
ment with theorists such as Fuller, who would consider this kind of
substantive generality to be an ‘external’ moral issue and not part of the ‘inner
morality of law’.38
29 Waldron (n 25) 49.
30 Dworkin (n 9) 189–90.
31 Postema (n 8) 25.
32 ibid 37–8.
33 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right’ in The Basic Political
Writings (Donald A Cress tr, Hackett 1987) 150: ‘For since the sovereign is formed entirely from the private
individuals who make it up, it neither has nor could have an interest contrary to theirs.’
34 RA Duff, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion: Citizen, Subjects and Outlaws’ (1998) 51 CLP 241, 253–6.
35 Rousseau (n 33) 157: ‘Thus, just as a private will cannot represent the general will, the general will, for its
part, alters its nature when it has a particular object; and as general, it is unable to render a decision on either a
man or a state of affairs.’
36 As we detail below, such problematic differentiation must be more than purely formal. It is plausible, for
example, that some individualised criminal regulation might be consistent with civic equality. Under such cir-
cumstances, any formal violation of the requirement that laws be general is prima facie only. As we define that
phenomenon, ad hominem criminalisation can make no such claim, since it necessarily differentiates between
regulatory subjects at the substantive level as well.
37 Finnis (n 11) 9–18.
38 Fuller (n 10) 46–9.
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The argument that anchors the Rule of Law to civic equality is this: whilst
there might be many reasons to institute and maintain a legal system—the
avoidance of coordination problems,39 the maintenance of civil peace40 and so
on—one important reason is the institutionalisation of equal treatment
through uniform standards of behaviour.41 As Dworkin notes,42 government
by law ‘fuses citizens’ moral and political lives: it asks the good citizen, decid-
ing how to treat his neighbor when their interests conflict, to interpret the
common scheme of justice to which they are both committed just in virtue of
citizenship’.43
This is practically advantageous in circumstances where people disagree
about what values such as justice, fairness and equality truly require.44
Although no single set of legal standards will cohere with every divergent view,
any set that is sufficiently general will establish each citizen as equally subject
to the same governing principles, such that they need not fear becoming sub-
ject to the purely personal convictions of anyone else.45 This permits all citi-
zens to identify with the law that governs them, albeit in an attenuated
manner. For, although such laws may not ‘belong’ to any one person, in that
those directives did not originate from purely personal acts of will, the very
impersonality of law means that properly constituted legal standards belong to
one individual no less than they do to any other.46 Indeed, under such condi-
tions, intentional law-breaking can be interpreted as the substitution of these
impersonal standards for personal judgment. Absent appropriate justification,
such substitution risks the implicit assertion that compliance with one’s own
desires or beliefs should trump the maintenance of civic equality. Such behav-
iour disrespects the distinct and valuable mode of association the Rule of Law
represents. This, we contend, is the true normative weight and underlying
value behind Dicey’s famous requirement that ‘every man, whatever his rank
or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the
jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals’.47
C. The Problem of Unequal Laws
That some laws (whether criminal or otherwise) can promote inequality poses
no serious objection to the position outlined above. Whilst there is nothing
39 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor tr, CUP 2017) 49 [6:255–7].
40 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (JCA Gaskin ed, OUP 1996) 122.
41 Allan (n 1) 38–40.
42 See also Habermas, who argues, ‘Dworkin’s basic standard of “integrity” stands for the political ideal by
which citizens recognize one another as free and equal, and are obligated to realize the basic norm of equal con-
cern and respect for each person in the practices of society’: Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Polity Press 1997) 215.
43 Dworkin (n 9) 189–90.
44 Allan (n 1) 24–5.
45 Kant (n 39) 99 [6:314]; Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago UP 1960) 153.
46 Dworkin (n 9) 189; Postema (n 4) 29; Duff (n 34) 255.
47 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of The Law of the Constitution (first published 1885, 10th edn,
Macmillan 1959) 193.
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about governance by general principles that necessarily excludes standards
with inegalitarian consequences,48 it does not follow that this mode of associ-
ation lacks all ‘equality-value’. To see why, an analogy is helpful. It is generally
accepted that our personal autonomy is served by us making choices for our-
selves. However, it also seems clear that some choices may limit our overall
and ongoing autonomy. For example, remortgaging one’s home to buy a Tesla
would likely have injurious financial consequences that would seriously limit
the autonomy of the individual in question. Nonetheless, it would be both ec-
centric and unmotivated to claim that such unwise choices had no value as far
as our personal autonomy was concerned. If they are truly free choices, in the
sense of being both unforced and uncoerced,49 then they are also instances of
that autonomy being exercised. The interesting point in relation to such cases
seems to be that their ‘autonomy-value’ is qualified. They both instantiate and
frustrate autonomy: exemplifying it as a means whilst producing a counterpro-
ductive end. This may make them qualified examples of autonomous decision
making, but they remain examples nonetheless.
The position of inegalitarian laws is similar. On the assumption that such
principles are sufficiently general, in that they speak to the public as a whole
rather than to status-differentiated individuals or subgroups, the fact that they
may produce inegalitarian outcomes does not altogether negate their equality-
value as a means for governance. For example, laws relating to inheritance
and bequeathment arguably play a significant role in the perpetuation of social
injustice by maintaining inequality of resources.50 Nonetheless, they are suffi-
ciently general in character to govern entire political communities and so
evince no implicit denial of civic equality as an individual status. Like free
choices that limit our long-term autonomy, inegalitarian laws occupy a com-
plex position: they instantiate equality as a means whilst undermining it as an
end. They are, to this extent, qualified examples of government by law whilst
nonetheless remaining meaningful institutionalisations of civic equality.
Note that to accept the qualified equality-value possessed by laws with in-
egalitarian consequences is not to endorse what is sometimes called ‘formal’
equality. That principle, given its clearest expression by Aristotle, stands mere-
ly for the logical precept that ‘like cases must be treated alike’.51 Exclusive re-
liance upon it within legal reasoning has often been critiqued as little more
than disguised prejudice and nothing about our position seeks to prove other-
wise.52 Instead, we take substantive equality to be a multifaceted concept of
48 Raz (n 14) 215–16.
49 On the distinction between force and coercion, see Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’ in Sidney Morgen Besser,
Patrick Souppes and Morton White (eds), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel (St
Martin’s Press 1969).
50 Daniel Halliday, Inheritance of Wealth: Justice, Equality, and the Right to Bequeath (OUP 2018) 102–54.
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3. 1131a10–b15; Politics, III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23.
52 Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20(1)
Yale J L & Feminism 1, 2–5.
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which status-based civic equality represents just one dimension.53 Civic equal-
ity of the sort that interests us stands in particularly strong relation to the
Rule of Law; however, it is not the only form of substantive equality that law
can instantiate. Good laws will often promote social, economic or religious
equality, to name but a few examples. Some of these egalitarian advances may
touch upon civic status, whilst others will not. Concurrently, laws with inegali-
tarian consequences remain bad laws to that extent, even though they may
nonetheless institutionalise civic equality. They may, for example, produce un-
equal distributions of wealth, opportunity or welfare.54 But this alone cannot
entail status-inequality: deeper differentiation of that kind will only be present
to the extent that divergent conceptions of the legal subject qua citizen (or
otherwise) can be located within the law.55 As we argue below, ad hominem
criminalisation, exemplified by the KCPO, is paradigmatically status-
inegalitarian in this way.
The conceptual advantages of the view articulated in this subsection are
threefold. First, our analysis maintains the important distinction between laws
which are bad—because, say, they produce inegalitarian outcomes—and bad
laws: those lacking the characteristic virtues the Rule of Law promotes.
Second, by nonetheless emphasising the connection between government by
law and the institutionalisation of equality, it draws attention to the conceptual
tensions created by laws that institute civic equality whilst simultaneously
undermining adjacent egalitarian values. Third, and most importantly for pre-
sent purposes, it clarifies a distinct way in which particular laws undermine the
Rule of Law. As we emphasise below, any law that differentiates between (i)
the civic status of certain individuals or subgroups and (ii) the status enjoyed
by the public at large cannot comply with civic equality.56 This sets the law in
question directly at odds with the distinct mode of association instituted by
the horizontal dimension of the Rule of Law.
D. Civic Exclusion and the Distinctiveness of Ad Hominem
Criminalisation
This complex relationship between the Rule of Law and (civic) equality per-
tains, we argue, in respect of all laws. Within this broader rubric, however,
criminal laws hold a special and problematic place. This pertains due to the
latter’s characteristic use of punishment, which, as Duff explains, ‘express[es]
53 Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14 ICON 712.
54 On these various conceptions of equality, see Amartya Sen, ‘Equality of What?’ in S McMurrin (ed),
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, I (CUP 1980); Gerry Cohen, ‘Equality of What? on Welfare, Goods, and
Capabilities’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), The Quality of Life (OUP 1993).
55 Alex Green, ‘Three Models of Political Membership: Delineating ‘The People in Question” (2021) 41
OJLS 565, 568–76.
56 This is not to suggest that all such violations of civic equality necessarily constitute ad hominem criminal-
isation. As we argue below, the latter phenomenon constitutes a uniquely complex and egregious wrong of this
broader type.
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the polity’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct as a wrong’, such that the
substantive prohibitions of criminal law ‘define wrongs that merit the condem-
nation and punishment for which [criminal justice as a whole] provides’.57
Such punishments consist in various restrictions upon liberty, some more ex-
treme than others. Most importantly, many criminal punishments restrict the
physical liberty of those subject to them, whether through curfew, geographical
limitations upon free movement or incarceration. Criminal punishment in this
mode contrasts starkly with the core functions of private law, for example,
which are to compensate and to offer restitution.58
Although he deplores this feature of contemporary criminal justice, Duff
accepts that punishment of the above sort often operates so as to ‘treat those
who violate our criminal laws as outsiders who have forfeited their status as
citizens’.59 By limiting the physical freedom of convicted offenders, criminal
law does more than express the fact that they committed a wrong, which pri-
vate law arguably also accomplishes by publicly decreeing someone liable to
compensate someone else.60 Insofar as they impose limitations upon physical
liberty—and thereby factually exclude individuals from full social participa-
tion—such characteristic criminal punishments expressively exclude subject
individuals from full civic equality, at least while their factual exclusion contin-
ues to pertain.61 It is this exclusionary function—this demarcation of civic
‘outsiders’62—that we take to be the most distinctive and problematic aspect
of criminal regulation.63 Whereas private law may express censure for various
wrongs committed by individuals within the same polity, criminal law demar-
cates particular conduct as so wrongful that it (at least temporarily) disrupts
the status of the perpetrator as a member of society with full civic privileges.64
57 RA Duff, ‘Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and others (eds), The Boundaries of
Criminal Law (OUP 2010) 89.
58 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (OUP 2012) 133–42.
59 RA Duff, ‘A Criminal Law to Call Our Own?’ (2017) 111 Northwestern University Law Review 1491,
1495.
60 Weinrib (n 58) 105–7.
61 For an historical account of the denial of citizenship to and social exclusion of perceived ‘deviants’ on
moral grounds, see David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies (Gower 1985).
62 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Penguin Books 1991) 90.
63 Whilst this argument focuses upon physical liberty, it nonetheless coheres with various non-physical
restrictions of civic entitlement, such as the suspension of voting rights. Indeed, it arguably supports our ac-
count of criminal sanctions that such civic restrictions characteristically coincide with incarceration: the civic ex-
clusion effected by incarceration is reinforced where incarcerated individuals are also disenfranchised for the
duration. Moreover, if restrictions upon physical liberty are understood not as just one mode through which
criminal justice is implemented but rather as the central case of criminal punishment, then the expressive force of
other non-physical sanctions, such as fines, can be explained by implication. If the central case of criminal pun-
ishment is one in which convicted persons are socially excluded, then the mere designation of an offence as
criminal will characteristically insinuate severe transgression: Victor Tadros, ‘Criminalization and Regulation’ in
Duff and others (n 57) 164–5. This establishes one way in which criminal fines can be distinguished from
orders for civil compensation. See generally Pat O’Malley, ‘Theorizing Fines’ (2009) 11 Punishment and
Society 67.
64 Richard Dagger, ‘Republicanism and Crime’ in Samantha Besson and Jose Luis Martı (eds), Legal
Republicanism: National and International Perspectives (OUP 2009) 148; cf Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner,
‘Just Prevention: Preventative Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and Stuart Green
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 282.
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Given the above, the close connection between the Rule of Law and civic
equality poses a radical possibility: namely, that, at least on its face, punitive
criminal justice qua exclusionary technique seems incompatible with the egali-
tarian basis of legality in general. This is so because the essence of civic equal-
ity is that of (status-based) inclusion, whilst the sine qua non of criminal justice
is that of exclusion. Grappling with that larger issue falls outwith the scope of
this article, although the prospect remains intriguing. For present purposes,
we acknowledge two possibilities: first, that some appropriate argument might
show how punitive social exclusion could be rendered normatively compatible
with civic equality, such that criminal justice might be ultimately justifiable
vis-à-vis the Rule of Law; and second, that no such compatibility is possible,
such that punitive regulation (and therefore criminal law as such) must ultim-
ately be rejected as inconsistent with legality. The point for now is that which-
ever alternative proves true, our account of ad hominem criminalisation
remains both practically important and theoretically interesting. This is so be-
cause even if criminal punishment violates civic equality in general, ad homi-
nem criminalisation, as we argue, constitutes a uniquely complex and
egregious violation of that sort. Moreover, by explaining why, we provide a
point of departure for more general critiques of criminal justice from a status-
egalitarian point of view. Conversely, should some convincing integration of
criminal justice and egalitarian legality become available, our arguments would
survive by way of demonstrating that ad hominem criminalisation necessarily
falls outwith any such integrated justification.
Ultimately, both eventualities turn on the same substantive proposition,
upon which our argument elaborates at length: that no set of criminal prohibi-
tions can be justified vis-à-vis status-egalitarianism unless all members of the
relevant polity are governed by that set and only that set. Any divergence from
this, whether in the form of personal exemption from or asymmetric subjec-
tion to additional criminal regulation, does significant expressive harm civic
equality.65 This is so because: (i) the very status of civic equals is instantiated
and expressed by their subjection to the same scheme of governing principles;
and (ii) the onerous and exclusionary nature of criminal regulation heightens
the need for justification in these terms. To hold anyone personally exempt
from regulation under the full set of criminal laws that apply to their compa-
triots does expressive harm to the horizontal equality that the Rule of Law
65 As such, our focus is ultimately upon the content of the criminal law—that is, which and how many norms
it contains—rather than upon the process by which it is enforced. Therefore, although we exemplify our argu-
ment with reference to a regulatory technique that takes a very particular procedural form (that is, the KCPO),
our interest in procedure extends only so far as the latter informs the substantive concerns we raise in relation
to ad hominem criminalisation. To that extent, our argument differs in focus from Ericson’s theory of ‘counter-
law’, which primarily examines those norms that undermine the procedural guarantees that criminal law trad-
itionally provides: Richard Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World (Polity Press 2007) 207. Moreover, although
Ericson notes how antisocial behaviour laws permit discretionary threat assessments that risk those subject to
them being ‘exclu[ded] from membership in a valued community’ (ibid 200, 211), he does not connect this cri-
tique to the idea of civic equality, which forms our analytical focus here.
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maintains. Moreover, and crucially for our arguments below, to single out any
individual or group for additional criminal regulation harms civic equality in
precisely the same manner and, under certain circumstances, to a far greater
degree. Therefore, whatever the general compatibility between criminal justice
and the Rule of Law may be, ad hominem criminalisation, as we define that
phenomenon, remains manifestly impermissible.
3. Ad Hominem Criminalisation and the Rule of Law
In this section, we argue that ad hominem criminalisation constitutes a distinct-
ively egregious violation of civic equality. To do so, we begin by returning to
the distinction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the Rule of
Law, arguing that some governmental wrongdoing under the vertical dimen-
sion of that concept is best characterised as an intentional or careless violation
of the civic equality that its horizontal dimension exists to protect. Next, we
contend that ad hominem criminalisation represents a paradigmatic mode of
such governmental wrongdoing and, moreover, one with a unique structure.
Namely, we say that ad hominem criminalisation occurs whenever ‘individual-
ised’ criminal regulation, either explicitly or implicitly, differentiates between
the status of (i) particular individuals or groups and (ii) society at large in
such a way as to instrumentalise the treatment of the former for the benefit of
the latter. It is the distinct combination of these three elements—individualisa-
tion, differentiation and instrumentalisation—that renders ad hominem crimin-
alisation so uniquely egregious.
A. Horizontal Violation through Vertical Breach
The previous section distinguished two dimensions of the Rule of Law to elu-
cidate the connection between that concept and the value of civic equality. In
this subsection we draw an important connection between ‘horizontal’ and
‘vertical’ legality by arguing that certain kinds of governmental wrongdoing
are best characterised as attacks upon the distinct ‘mode of association’ that
the Rule of Law creates. In the first place, as Dworkin’s maintains, govern-
ment according to law matters
not merely in the sense that the law is enforced as written, but in the more conse-
quential sense that government must govern under a set of principles in principle ap-
plicable to all. Arbitrary coercion or punishment violates that crucial dimension of political
equality, even if, from time to time, it does make government more efficient.66
Arbitrary governmental decision making violates civic equality for similar
reasons to individual law breaking. Whether operating as group agents or as
66 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 OJLS 1, 29 (em-
phasis added).
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collections of individuals,67 governments acting outside their legal authority
substitute the behaviour law requires with a freestanding and unlicensed deci-
sional act, in much the same way that an individual citizen might. This disre-
spects civic equality because it casts governments as more than the executive
agents of their people, constituted for the purposes of securing their commun-
ities of law. Rather, it implies them to be rulers in the more elevated sense of
social or civic superiors, justified in issuing unilateral decrees to their inferior
subjects.68 This abrogation of equal status is contrary to the horizontal dimen-
sion of the Rule of Law even though it manifests as a vertical breach of the so-
cial contract between the rulers and the ruled.
Indeed, such vertical violations arguably attack the egalitarian spirit of the
Rule of Law more vociferously than violations on the part of any individual
citizen. As Murphy argues, all obligations to obey the law, even though
grounded in the same basic set of moral considerations, are agent-relative in
that their normative weight depends upon the harm non-compliance would do
to government under law itself.69 Governments are uniquely placed to do con-
siderable harm in this regard, given: (i) their pivotal role in securing the Rule
of Law within our public institutions; and (ii) their relative potency vis-à-vis
the personal power of most private individuals. Violations of legality perpe-
trated by governments also have significant expressive impact because of the
trust that is necessarily placed in them by their people.70 Within a community
of law, such acts subvert a core purpose of government: the maintenance of
civic equality through the institution of law.
In what follows, we argue that arbitrary coercion or punishment is not the
only form of harm that our rulers can perpetrate against the Rule of Law: it
can also be attacked through acts that take legal form but nonetheless run
contrary to civic equality. Specifically, we contend that any laws engaged in ad
hominem criminalisation are incompatible with the status-egalitarian founda-
tions of legality, even if they are otherwise Rule of Law compliant. Such ad
hominem laws go beyond creating inegalitarian outcomes, such as creating or
maintaining unjustifiable resource distributions. Instead, they either explicitly
or implicitly target particular individuals or subgroups, differentiate them as
‘enemies’ or ‘dangerous others’71 and then instrumentalise them as a means
67 See generally Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate
Agents (OUP 2011).
68 Duff (n 34) 245–6.
69 Liam Murphy, What Makes Law: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (CUP 2015) 137–9.
70 That governments are sometimes institutionally accountable does not remove the need for this trust. See
Melaine Ehren, Andrew Paterson and Jacqueline Baxter, ‘Accountability and Trust: Two Sides of the Same
Coin?’ (2020) 21 Journal of Educational Change 183.
71 When using such terms, our intention is not to examine, as Ramsay does, the coherence of an (allegedly)
representative government claiming legitimate authority to protect ‘the public’ against ‘those who manifest a dis-
position that fails to reassure, [and] those who are perceived as dangerous’: Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State:
Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (OUP 2012) 65. Instead, we argue that any
such bifurcation of society is normatively suspect vis-à-vis the Rule of Law, whatever the position might be in
relation to representative government. Moreover, unlike Ramsay, our analytical focus is not upon the existence
(or otherwise) of a legal infrastructure that purportedly grounds a general ‘right to security’, which he describes
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for the security of the majority.72 This undermines the status as citizens of
those affected by placing them in a tripartite, asymmetric and ultimately un-
justifiable regime of criminal regulation.
B. Ad Hominem Criminalisation and Civic Equality
‘The most fundamental objection’ to instances of ad hominem legislation ‘is
their violation of the principle of equality that there should not be “a special
rule for a particular person or a particular case”’.73 This stems, as Allan
explains, from the more general proposition:
Victimization of unpopular persons or despised minorities is excluded not merely by
the requirement that coercion must be authorized by general rules, but by the further
requirement that those rules should themselves be justified by policies or principles
consistent with the ideal of equal citizenship.74
In section 2, we described this ideal of civic equality in terms of the distinct
‘mode of association’ established by the Rule of Law’s horizontal dimension
and, in the previous subsection, we further argued that particular kinds of gov-
ernmental wrongdoing can undermine these (status-based) associative bonds.
In this subsection, we characterise ad hominem criminalisation as one distinct-
ive mode of such wrongdoing, building upon the insights of Allan and others
to offer a general definition that captures its uniquely egregious violation of
civic equality. On our account, ad hominem criminalisation exists wherever law,
through the use of individualised control, either explicitly or implicitly, differ-
entiates between the status of (i) particular individuals or groups and (ii) soci-
ety at large in such a way as to instrumentalise the treatment of the former for
the benefit of the latter. These three elements—individualised control, differ-
entiation and instrumentalisation—each raise distinct moral issues vis-à-vis
status-egalitarianism. Moreover, when all are instantiated within the same legal
directive, civic equality is violated to an uniquely egregious degree.
Individualised control, to quote Crawford, consists in ‘tailoring the response
and regulatory regime—the rules, obligations, conditions, support arrange-
ments, mechanisms for enforcement and monitoring outcomes—to the cir-
cumstances of those who are the subjects of regulation’.75 Whatever its other
merits might be, this kind of regulation creates a formal asymmetry between
those subject to it and those ‘ordinary’ citizens who remain regulated by non-
individualised legal standards. This is problematic because, as argued above,
the very status of civic equality is instantiated and expressed by a society’s
in places as a right to feel secure (ibid 2–6). Instead, we focus upon the normative permissibility of a particular
regulatory technique (that is, ad hominem criminalisation) from the perspective of status-egalitarianism.
72 Ramsay identifies this instrumentalisation in relation to the now-defunct ASBO: ibid 59–61, 65, 79.
73 Allan (n 1) 246 (citing Hurtado v California 110 US 516 (1884), 535–6).
74 ibid 39.
75 Adam Crawford, ‘Governing through Anti-Social Behaviour: Regulatory Challenges to Criminal Justice’
(2009) 49 Brit J Criminol 810, 820.
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uniform subjection to the same scheme of governing principles. Any formal
asymmetry that seemingly diverges from this mode of association condition
must therefore demonstrably cohere with civic equality in substantive terms or
stand in violation of that ideal. In the criminal context, particularly given the
exclusionary nature of punitive sanctions, this entails that such asymmetry
imposes a uniquely weighty burden upon government to demonstrate that
individualised criminal regulation ‘corresponds to an intelligible requirement
of the public good’, such that civic equality is publicly observed.76 Crucially,
given the demands of civic equality, this public good cannot be ‘the utilitarian
“greatest good of the greatest number”’ but must be that of ‘an all-round asso-
ciation’, capable of ‘securing . . . a whole ensemble of material and other condi-
tions that tend to favour the realisation, by each individual in the community, of
his or her personal development’.77 This means that, for individualised control
to be consistent with the egalitarian foundations of the Rule of Law, the asym-
metry it generates must be justified by an appeal to the security of a body pol-
itic to which the subject individual possesses equal membership (and therefore
equal civic status). If no such justification is provided—or if what has been
provided is normatively implausible—then the prima facie violation of civic
equality represented by the formal asymmetry of individualised control will
truly undermine civic equality. Our concern is that, in the case of genuine ad
hominem criminalisation, the twin vices of differentiation and instrumentalisa-
tion operate so as to implicitly deny equal status of this kind. In so doing,
these vices both compound and confirm the prima facie expression of status-
inequality individualised control affects.
Differentiation, in the relevant sense, must be fundamental, speaking to the
status of an individual or group qua member(s) of the broader community.
Such basic differentiation has two indicative features. First, unlike legal cate-
gories that demarcate particular individuals as ‘special’ for more discrete pur-
poses—as trustees, contractual parties or creditors, for example—the
differentiation that grounds ad hominem criminalisation is non-consensual. For
example, in Liyanage v R, legislation struck down by the Privy Council had
purported to create a new criminal offence that retrospectively targeted those
perceived responsible for a failed political insurrection in Sri Lanka.78 Perhaps
obviously, this ex ante criminalisation did not take the form of a voluntarily
adopted role but of an imposed status alteration.
The second indicative feature of the differentiation that marks ad hominem
criminalisation, which Liyanage also exemplifies, is that it casts the subject
individuals or subgroups as ‘outsiders’, in the sense that they are negatively
contrasted, at the level of their political and social status, with the community
at large. Most importantly, this invidious differentiation must attach to the
76 Allan (n 1) 238.
77 Finnis (n 11) 154 (emphasis added).
78 [1967] 1 AC 259.
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presence of individualised control, such that it is in large part their being tar-
geted by the relevant legal techniques that precipitates these individuals suffer-
ing an alteration of status.79 Whether explicitly or implicitly, the individualised
control at issue must violate the egalitarian maxim discussed in section 2: that
the whole polity must be governed by a single set of criminal laws and that if
it is not—that is, if some individuals are subject to more criminal regulations
than others—then civic equality, and the very cohesion of that polity as a com-
munity of equals, is undermined.
In extreme cases, such problematically differentiating laws present the indi-
viduals or subgroups they target as ‘enemies’ faced by the larger community,80
who not only ‘threaten’, but also thereby come to define that community
through rhetorical contradistinction.81 As explained by Carvalho, within such
differential regulation,
Anxiety . . . is taken to its ultimate consequences, as responsible subjects are taken to
have the capacity to seriously endanger the integrity of the political community by
means of their agency . . .any individual who is identified as potentially dangerous has
to be contained before s/he can put the community at risk.82
This intentional division of our political communities into ‘virtuous major-
ities’ and ‘dangerous others’ strikes at the very heart of civic equality.83 It cre-
ates, in effect, two (status-based) classes of citizen: those to whom the
ordinary criminal law applies, with its emphasis upon proven wrongdoing and
personal responsibility, and those who are treated as ‘naturally’ suspect, whose
criminality is a function of their legally and socially constructed identity, not
the fact that they have engaged in criminal behaviour under the complete set
of laws that apply to their compatriots.84 Even though they might not breach
any formal desiderata of the Rule of Law, any laws that enact differentiations
of this kind are necessarily incompatible with the egalitarian foundations
described in section 2. Any mode of association that differentiates between the
fundamental status of individuals in this prejudicial manner cannot embody
79 To this extent, ad hominem criminalisation is a more discrete phenomenon than what Lacey refers to as
‘status criminalisation’. See Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions
(OUP 2016) 158.
80 On ‘enemy criminal law’, see Daniel Ohana, ‘Trust, Distrust and Reassurance: Diversion and Preventive
Orders through the Prism of Feindstrafrecht’ (2010) 73 MLR 721; Daniel Ohana, ‘Günter Jakob’s
Feindstrafretch: A Dispassionate Account’ in Markus Dubber (ed), Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law
(OUP 2014).
81 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (G Schwab tr, Chicago UP 2007) 26–9, 38, 43–4.
82 Henrique Carvalho, The Preventive Turn in Criminal Law (OUP 2017) 182.
83 Hendry (n 26).
84 This distinction between the complete set of criminal laws that govern ‘ordinary’ or ‘virtuous’ citizens and
the larger, more restrictive set that governs ‘dangerous others’ is not to be confused with the distinction that
Dubber makes between criminal law as such and ‘criminal police’. For Dubber, policing constitutes an al-
together different mode of governance from that of the criminal law. By contrast, our concern is rather that
morally problematic differentiation, when attached to individualised control, constitutes an unjust bifurcation
within the criminal law itself. See Markus Dubber, ‘Criminal Police and Criminal Law in the Rechsstat’ in
Markus Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), Police and the Liberal State (Stanford UP 2008) 95–6; Markus
Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (Columbia UP 2005) 3.
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the ideal of civic equality. As such, it represents an internally conflicted ex-
ample of legal regulation and an aberrant case of government by law.85
The harm done by individualised control that differentiates in this way is
further compounded by the final feature of ad hominem criminalisation: instru-
mentalisation. Within a community committed to civic equality, each individ-
ual must be deemed worthy of what Dworkin referred to as ‘equal concern
and respect’.86 This is echoed by Finnis, as quoted above, when he speaks of
the Rule of Law as requiring ‘each member of the community’ (that is, not
just the majority or an ‘elite’) to be treated as meriting the opportunity for
‘personal development’.87 Compliance with principles of this sort need not
imply thoroughgoing egalitarianism, in the sense of promoting equality of wel-
fare, resources or capacities.88 However, it does necessitate that each citizen
be treated as fundamentally equal in status to every other. The instrumental-
ism that marks ad hominem criminalisation undermines this important egalitar-
ian maxim by setting apart subject individuals in another, more insidious
manner than the problematic differentiation discussed above. By deploying
individualised control in response to the perceived danger that certain individ-
uals or subgroups represent, ad hominem criminalisation imposes additional
criminal regulations upon those persons in the name of collective security.89
This emphasis on the security of the majority, when procured through the
asymmetric treatment of those subject to differential regulation, implicitly
communicates the justifiability of treating those people as a means to a major-
itarian end.
Instrumentalisation does discrete expressive harm to the notion of equal sta-
tus that magnifies the existing divisions communicated by individualisation
and the differentiation of the body politic into ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘danger-
ous others’. Any political community that regulates in this instrumental way
is, to use Kantian parlance, incapable of existing as a ‘kingdom of ends’, with-
in which each individual is recognised as being of absolute value, rather than
simply of the relative value imparted by their instrumental utility towards
securing some end.90 Given that the horizontal dimension of the Rule of Law
entails a commitment to the equal status of each citizen, it cannot be recon-
ciled with the variability that such relative value implies. As such, any purely
instrumental treatment will be at odds with civic equality and will violate the
egalitarian precepts of the Rule of Law as a distinct mode of association. Ad
hominem criminalisation, insofar as it licenses the individualised control of
85 This diagnosis is therefore ‘deeper’ than concluding that the egalitarian merits of a particular law are quali-
fied. Laws that differentiate vis-à-vis basic status do more than produce inegalitarian outcomes: they construct
status-inequality by deconstructing the legal expression(s) of civic membership.
86 Dworkin (n 9) 213.
87 Finnis (n 11) 154.
88 Sen (n 54).
89 Ramsay (n 71) 120.
90 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor tr, CUP 1998) 41.
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some citizens purely as a means to promoting the security of others, violates
this egalitarian maxim in precisely that way.
To summarise, ad hominem criminalisation represents a distinctively egre-
gious violation of the Rule of Law. By deploying individualised control as a
purely instrumental means for promoting public security, and by representing
those subject to that control as outwith the community proper, ad hominem
criminalisation undermines civic equality via a threefold signification that not
all citizens qualify for regulation by the laws that govern more ‘virtuous’ or
‘ordinary’ people. In what remains, we argue that Knife Crime Prevention
Orders, as established by sections 14 and 21 of the Offensive Weapons Act
2019, are paradigmatic of this problematic regulatory approach and, as a re-
sult, that they stand in an uneasy relationship with the Rule of Law.
4. Knife Crime Prevention Orders as an Ad Hominem
Regime
The Knife Crime Prevention Order was introduced with the stated aims of: (i)
reducing the rising rates of knife-related violence in England and Wales; and
(ii) equipping police with the means to ‘divert those who may be carrying kni-
ves . . . away from being involved in knife crime’.91 A hybrid civil/criminal pre-
ventive procedure, KCPOs are ostensibly civil in character but carry criminal
sanctions in the event of breach.92 In this regard, they mirror the two-step
structure of the controversial and now-defunct Antisocial Behaviour Order
(ASBO)93 and other civil preventive orders.94 We argue that the escalatory
and hybrid structure of KCPOs, together with the sociolegal context that is
likely to occasion their application and enforcement, places them in funda-
mental tension with the Rule of Law.95
Specifically, we contend that sections 14 and 21 of the 2019 Act create an
ad hominem criminal regime—targeting a young, urban and predominantly
91 Home Office, Guidance on Knife Crime Prevention Orders (Home Office 2019).
92 Hendry (n 26).
93 The ASBO was available between 1998 and 2014 in England and Wales to anyone aged 10 or over.
ASBOs were imposed by courts employing the criminal standard of proof and stipulated only negative require-
ments. This form of regulation has a long history of being treated as suspect vis-à-vis the Rule of Law. See, eg
Andrew Ashworth and others, ‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive: The Government’s “Anti-Social Behaviour
Order” Proposals (1998) 16 Criminal Justice 7.
94 See generally Stephen Shute, ‘Rationalising Civil Preventive Orders: Opportunities for Reform’ in JJ Child
and RA Duff (eds), Criminal Law Reform Now: Proposals and Critique (Hart Publishing 2018); Carvalho (n 82);
A Ashworth and L Zedner, Preventive Justice (OUP 2014).
95 As such, although our discussion of KCPOs covers some thematically similar ground, it is methodological-
ly distinct from other work which addresses preventive regulation. Ramsay, for example, offers an ‘immanent
critique’ of the right to security as an emergent legal phenomenon (Ramsay (n 71) 4, 9), which proceeds in a
heuristic and therefore explanatory manner, turning only to normative critique insofar as it helps to identify in-
ternal inconsistencies and so ‘lay bare [security’s] conceptual and normative structure’ within the object of inter-
pretation. By contrast, we provide an external normative critique of (i) ad hominem criminalisation conceived as
a moral/political wrong and (ii) one preventive regulatory technique (that is, the KCPO), the latter of which is
employed primarily to facilitate the former. Since this critique departs from a robustly egalitarian external per-
spective, it operates in sharp contrast to Ramsay’s primarily explanatory undertaking.
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minority ethnic population—notwithstanding the general manner in which
those provisions are phrased. First, we outline the legal framework that makes
KCPOs available in the absence of a criminal conviction.96 Second, we detail
the ways in which KCPOs constitute individualised criminal regulation. Third,
we provide an argument in favour of the notion that the 2019 Act problemat-
ically differentiates between the intended targets of KCPOs and the remainder
of society. Finally, we claim that this differentiation is motivated by a logic of
securitisation, which wrongfully instrumentalises the set of individuals envi-
sioned as becoming subject to KCPOs. Thus, all three elements of ad hominem
criminalisation are made out.
A. The Legal Framework
Section 14 of Part 2 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 provides that courts
can make a KCPO in respect of a person aged 12 or over if that court is satis-
fied, on the balance of probabilities, that this person has ‘had a bladed article
with them without good reason or lawful authority’ in a public place, school
or college on at least two occasions within the preceding two years. In add-
ition, the court must find that such an order is necessary to protect the public,
or specific members of the public, from the risk of harm involving a bladed
article, or to prevent the defendant from committing a crime with said bladed
article. Importantly, although such an order can be made without a criminal
conviction, significant penalties can follow. Breach of a KCPO constitutes an
offence, for which punitive sanctions, such as a custodial sentence of up to 24
months, can be imposed.97
Individuals made subject to a KCPO are obliged to comply with specific
positive and negative requirements. Under section 21 of the Act, negative
requirements can comprise geographical, associational and temporal restric-
tions (curfew), both online and offline, while positive requirements can in-
clude duration-stipulated attendance at counselling and/or educational
courses. We argue that these requirements, which ‘combine to comprise severe
and lengthy restrictions upon [an] individual’s movements and activity, both
online and offline’,98 effectively take the form of personalised laws.99 This is
problematic in itself, rendering the individual restricted under the order
96 KCPOs can also be made on conviction under section 19 of the same Act, where the prosecution applies
for one in addition to either: (i) the sentence imposed in respect of the offence (7a); or (ii) a conditional dis-
charge order (7b). However, while, in terms of due process considerations, this appears to be preferable, the evi-
dence admissible for determining the suitability of such an order is not restricted by the usual requirements for
criminal proceedings (subsection 9). (The 2019 published Home Office Guidance not only states explicitly that
the strict rules of criminal evidence do not apply in these circumstances, but also that the application can ‘rely
on the facts of the case for which the defendant has been convicted’: Home Office (n 91) 6.) Although this ar-
guably gives rise to separate procedural concerns, these are not our focus.
97 Offensive Weapons Act 2019, s 29(2).
98 Hendry (n 26) 4.
99 For an analogous point in relation to ASBOs, see JC Smith, ‘Antisocial Behaviour Order: Whether
Proceedings Civil or Criminal in Nature’ [2003] Crim LR 269, 271.
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subject to an asymmetric regime of regulation and control. Furthermore, it runs
directly contrary to several fundamental principles of classical criminal law, not-
ably the presumption of innocence, as well as untying the otherwise necessary
correlation between criminal behaviour and criminal responsibility.100
B. Asymmetry and Individualised Control
Notable here are the different values at the heart of the respective regimes of
criminal justice and so-called ‘responsive regulation’. While ‘criminal justice is
founded on principles of independence and impartiality . . . regulation pro-
motes pluralistic and flexible pragmatism’.101 The effect of the move from
traditional criminal law to the more dynamic options afforded by responsive
regulation is, therefore, a shift from an established and publicly promulgated
general standard into differential, individualised treatment.102 The positive and
negative requirements of the KCPO are paradigmatic in this regard: custom-
ised behavioural controls and obligations facilitated by the order’s use of state
coercion over a person who has neither been convicted of a crime, nor has in
fact committed a crime for which another member of the public would be held simi-
larly liable.103
This situation is generated, by and large, by the two-step structure of the
KCPO.104 The undesirable behaviour is first identified by the court, which
imposes requirements geared towards the prevention of said behaviour and
accompanies these with notice that punishment will follow on violation of
these requirements. It is in this manner that the regulation is responsive: non-
compliance with the order’s provisions gives rise to an escalation of sanctions,
with the rationale being that this operates as a disincentive to proceed further
through the increasingly punitive stages of the ‘regulatory pyramid’.105
The procedural structure of the KCPO, as Hendry argues, thus elides the
‘classic distinction between compliance and punishment’.106 Consequently, an
individual made subject to such an order is fast-tracked into becoming
100 Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (OUP 2016) 188–92.
101 Hannah Quirk, Toby Seddon and Graham Smith, ‘Regulation & Criminal Justice: Exploring the
Connections and Disconnections’ in H Quirk, T Seddon and G Smith (eds), Regulation & Criminal Justice:
Developing a New Framework for Research & Policy Development (CUP 2010) 20.
102 Crawford (n 75).
103 By creating this asymmetry, individualisation distinguishes, in both procedural and normative terms, the
KCPO from the crime of knife possession: see Prevention of Crime Act 1953, s 1(1); Criminal Justice Act 1988,
ss 139(1) and 139A(1). Although such offences are often policed in a manner that betrays problematic differen-
tiation (see below), they do not legally individuate in the same manner. They are, to that extent, ‘ordinary’ or
‘standard’ criminal offences and therefore do not pose the civic (in)egalitarian problem of rendering some indi-
viduals subject to norms that their compatriots are not. For more on the distinctive aspects of crimes of posses-
sion, see Markus Dubber, ‘The Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and the Police Power Model of Criminal
Process’ in RA Duff and Stuart Green (eds), Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law
(OUP 2005).
104 Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, ‘Two-Step Prohibitions’ in Andreas von Hirsch and Andrew
Simester (eds), Incivilities: Regulating Offensive Behaviour (OUP 2006) 181–2.
105 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation (2002 OUP) 30.
106 Hendry (n 26) 9.
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punishable by the criminal law without undertaking criminal activity. To be
specific, any breach of the order can render the relevant individual liable to
punishment, ranging from a custodial sentence (lasting up to 24 months) or,
according to Home Office Guidance, any of the following: (i) unpaid work
(Community Payback); (ii) rehabilitation activities; (iii) undertaking particular
programme(s) geared towards behavioural changes; (iv) mental health treat-
ment (with the defendant’s consent); (v) drug rehabilitation and/or a drug
testing order (with consent); (vi) drug and/or alcohol treatment (with con-
sent); and (vii) alcohol abstinence and monitoring (again, with consent).107
This places individuals subject to KCPOs in an asymmetric position vis-à-vis
other members of the public, since anyone not subject to an order of this kind
could undertake the prohibited behaviour without risking punishment. For
such asymmetry to be consistent with the basic equality of citizens, the imple-
mentation of KCPOs must be capable of justification with reference to the
common good. If it is not, then it violates the status-egalitarian principle that
civic equality requires all legal subjects to be governed by just one set of
(criminal) laws. In what remains of this article, we argue that no such justifica-
tion would be plausible. The legislative intent and broader social context be-
hind the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 render its generality purely nominal.
Sections 14 and 21 create an ad hominem criminal regime that singles out spe-
cific populations within England and Wales, and expressively alienates them,
vis-à-vis their basic status, from their fellow citizens.
C. Knife Crime Prevention Orders and ‘The Dangerous Other’
As argued in section 3, ad hominem criminalisation can be distinguished from
otherwise justifiable instances of individualised criminal regulation by the pres-
ence of morally problematic differentiation and instrumentalisation. In terms
of differentiation, the starting point for analysis in the case of KCPOs must be
the social context of the contemporary England and Wales and, in particular,
its racial dynamics. It is in that context that sections 14 and 21 of the 2019
Act stand to be applied and, therefore, it is in light of that context that their
compliance with civic equality must be judged.
In the House of Lords debate on the amendments to the 2019 Bill,
Baroness Williams of Trafford explained that ‘The orders are aimed at three
groups of people: young people who have been carrying a knife; habitual knife
carriers of any age; and those who have been convicted of violent offences
involving knives’.108 However, as Hendry argues in relation to these three cat-
egories, ‘without needing to be told, without needing proof, the public already
believe that in the context of knife crime the offenders are young men of col-
our, benefit dependent, and involved in drugs, other anti-social behaviour,
107 Home Office (n 91) 18.
108 HL Deb 26 February 2019, vol 796, col 191.
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and low-level criminality’.109 These concerns were shared by more than one
member of the House of Lords during that same debate. As Lord Paddick—
who, prior to his retirement, served as Deputy Assistant Commissioner in
London’s Metropolitan Police Service—stated:
We know the disproportionate impact that this type of order has because of our expe-
riences with ASBOs. Stop and search is still used disproportionately on black and
minority-ethnic young people, and there is no evidence to suggest that these orders
will not be used in a similar way. A Youth Justice Board evaluation of ASBOs in
2006 found that 22% of young people given ASBOs were BAME—two and a half
times their proportion of the population.110
In this sense, the general language of the Offensive Weapons Act belies the
truth: that sections 14 and 21 in fact target young, poor, urban and dispropor-
tionately Black and minority ethnic populations. In so doing, it differentiates
them in status, implicitly casting them as a danger to everybody else. The exist-
ence of this intention is once again evinced by the concerns of Lord Paddick,
who notes that ‘the Government propose measures that turn youth workers into
law enforcers as the supervisors of KCPOs and reinforce the belief that even
the community police officers are there to arrest rather than protect you’.111
The true construction of any statutory provision is contingent not only
upon its linguistic content and legal context, but also upon broader sociolegal
considerations: upon the social background conditions within which the words
of that provision operate.112 In the case of KCPOs, the material background
conditions, as Lord Paddick’s concerns exemplify, are that England and Wales
have a problem of both race and class when it comes to criminal justice. This
problem is evidenced, for example, by the statistics relating to stop and search.
As the Standing Committee for Youth Justice has noted, ‘black people are 40
times more likely to be stopped and searched’.113 This raises particular prob-
lems in the context of KCPOs because
weapons are generally hidden about the person [and so] . . . are more likely to be
found via these methods. Black children are therefore more likely to be caught and
prosecuted for possession, whether or not they are more likely than their white coun-
terparts to be carrying a weapon.114
109 Hendry (n 26) 6; see also D Garland, The Culture of Control (OUP 2001) 136; P Williams and B Clarke,
‘The Black Criminal Other as an Object of Social Control’ (2018) 7 Social Sciences 234.
110 HL (n 108) col 195.
111 ibid col 196.
112 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Uses and Abuses of Socio-Legal Theory’ in Naomi Creutzfeldt,
Marc Mason and Kirsten McConnachie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods
(Routledge 2019) 35–57; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal
Studies’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 632.
113 Standing Committee for Youth Justice, ‘SCYJ Submission to Consultation on Knife Crime Prevention
Orders Guidance’, 3 <http://scyj.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FINAL-SCYJ-Submission-to-Consultation-on-
Knife-Crime-Prevention-Orders-Guidance.pdf>.
114 ibid.
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Against this background, the generality of the KCPO provisions flatters to
deceive. Sections 14 and 21 might be phrased in general terms, but their socio-
legal background effectively disables them from being applicable to all, even as
a matter of principle. The only way to sustain the alternative conclusion would
be to claim that ‘principle’, in the relevant sense, implies such dramatic es-
trangement from social reality as to exist only within the imagination of naive
idealists.115 Once again, the mode of differentiation at issue here is ‘basic’ in
that it goes beyond the establishment of egalitarian outcomes. The populations
envisioned by sections 14 and 21 are not just incidentally affected but implicitly
so—that is, by the very structure of those provisions within their proper social
context. This is, in other words, an instance of targeting, however covert, ra-
ther than one of ‘collateral’ disadvantage.
That the 2019 Act wrongfully differentiates between the ‘dangerous
others’ it implicitly targets and society at large is reflected in the concerns of
several prominent commentators. For instance, Linda Logan, chair of the
Magistrates Association’s Youth Court Committee, notes that her organisa-
tion is ‘particularly concerned that [the] use [of these orders] may worsen
existing overrepresentation of black, Asian and minority ethnic young people
in the justice system’.116 Similarly, the NGO Liberty has observed that sec-
tions 14 and 21 leave ‘ample scope for orders to be imposed based on con-
siderations such as where a person lives, where they go to school, or who
they are friends with; all of which may be crude proxies for race or socio-
economic status’.117 Other bodies opposed include the Local Government
Association, the Children’s Society and the All Party Parliamentary Group
on Knife Crime.118 This collective disquiet, we believe, has at least one com-
mon conceptual root. Whether they would articulate it in these terms or not,
each group mentioned above has discerned the violation of civic equality
that the 2019 Act effects through the differentiation it evinces between ‘or-
dinary’ citizens, deserving of the protections provided by the ‘ordinary’ crim-
inal law of England and Wales, and those ‘dangerous others’ implicitly
targeted by the KCPO provisions.119
D. Security and Instrumentalism
Having argued that KCPOs employ individualised control in a manner that
problematically differentiates ‘dangerous others’ from the ‘virtuous majority’,
115 See generally Nicola Lacey (2009) ‘Historicising Criminalisation: Conceptual and Empirical Issues’,
(2009) 72(6) MLR 936.
116 Linda Logan (6 March 2020) <www.magistrates-association.org.uk/News-and-Comments/knife-crime-pre
vention-orders-to-be-piloted-in-london>.
117 R Comyn, ‘Knife Crime Prevention Orders Would Only Harm the Fight against Violent Crime’ ( 6
February 2019) <www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/knife-crime-prevention-orders-would-only-harm-the-
fight-against-violent-crime/>.
118 HL (n 108) col 200.
119 Ohana (n 80).
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it remains to be demonstrated that they instrumentalise the treatment of the
former for the benefit of the latter. In this subsection, we argue that sections 14
and 21 of the 2019 Act do precisely that, compounding—and so cementing—
their violation of civic equality. As argued above, instrumentalisation intensi-
fies the expressive harm inflicted by differentiation and individualisation inso-
far as it treats those individuals subject to individualised control as a mere
means to securing a majoritarian end. Such a means/ends bifurcation of erst-
while compatriots is inconsistent with their equal status and so accentuates
the problematic nature of ad hominem criminalisation vis-à-vis the Rule of
Law.
In the context of KCPOs, instrumentalisation operates through the manner
in which the 2019 Act implicitly designates ‘both [specific] individuals and
whole groups of people as potentially deviant on grounds of risk mitigation and
crime prevention’.120 To this extent, justifications for the use of KCPOs, which
the government pushed through as an eleventh-hour addition to the 2019 Act,
are explicitly instrumentalist. The goal of sections 14 and 21 was ostensibly to
empower police to take preventive action in situations and against individuals
likely either to feature or commit knife violence, and by doing so to reduce
knife crime rates in England and Wales. More general justifications have been
articulated in terms of criminal law’s ‘preventive turn’, initiated in the 1990s
and intensified post-9/11.121 Examples include the rise of regulatory criminal
law and increased reliance on civil/criminal procedurally hybrid forms, notably
in the context of terrorism financing and hostile environment provisions,122
and the forfeiture of assets arising from serious and organised crime.123 Such
provisions are unified by their pre-emptive logic of securitisation,124 most
often mobilised in times of uncertainty or crisis, whether actual or perceived,
and both heavily cautious and risk-averse. According to this anticipatory or
‘pre-crime’ logic, punishment is no longer solely reactive or retrospective, in
the mode of holding wrongdoers to account,125 but rather something that can
be implemented prospectively for the express purpose of maximising security.
In climates of elevated risk—for example, like one where knife violence in
England and Wales is at a decade-long high126—the prospect of forestalling
harms before they occur is treated as being sufficiently important to render
120 Hendry (n 26) (original emphasis). See also Ericson (n 65) 206–8, 213–14.
121 See generally Carvalho (n 82); Ashworth and Zedner (n 94).
122 Lucia Zedner, ‘The Hostile Border: Crimmigration, Counter-Terrorism, or Crossing the Line on Rights?’
(2019) 22 New Crim L Rev 318; Jennifer Hendry, ‘The Hostile Environment and Crimmigration: Blurring the
Lines between Civil and Criminal Law’ (2020) 76 Soundings 26; see generally Colin King, Clive Walker and
Jimmy Gurule (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law (Palgrave Macmillan
2018).
123 Colin King and Jennifer Hendry, The Civil Recovery of Criminal Assets (OUP forthcoming); Jennifer
Hendry and Colin King, ‘Expediency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A Systems Perspective on Civil/
Criminal Procedural Hybrids’ (2017) 11 Criminal Law & Philosophy 733.
124 Lucia Zedner, Security (Routledge 2009) 73.
125 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 76–98.
126 Office for National Statistics, data for year ending December 2019 <www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationand
community/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables> accessed 20 June 2020.
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the elevated protections of the criminal law little more than costly and unten-
able extravagances.127
Which, to bring us full circle, signals the instrumental quality of civil/crim-
inal hybrid procedures. Indeed, KCPOs themselves are only the latest in a
long line of preventive hybrids targeted towards precluding undesirable behav-
iour by means of such controls as those outlined earlier.128 Such hybrid proce-
dures fit cleanly into the post-9/11 preventive turn and represent a broader
trend of eroding criminal law’s protective elements—bypassing the presump-
tion of innocence, characteristically sidestepping the requirement of propor-
tionality,129 evading the enhanced standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt—while fortifying its intrusive elements, both in scope and reach. In
their steady wearing down of due process and civil liberties, preventive hybrids
like KCPOs undermine the legal protections individuals possess against state
interference and control.
In normative terms, when placed under a KCPO in circumstances where no
criminal conviction has been made, an individual is implicitly reduced from an
equal citizen to an exploitable externality. Subject to a distinct and additional
regime of individualised control and criminal regulation, they are, to quote
Hendry: ‘both practically and symbolically . . . placed outwith. Outwith what,
precisely? Outwith the (rest of) the society allegedly being protected by such
securitised measures. Outwith the number of individuals aggregated to form
‘the public’, whose safety and security are apparently paramount.’130
Citizens who are instrumentalised in this way are no longer protected by
civic equality. They are expressively alienated from the distinct mode of associ-
ation established by the horizontal dimension of the Rule of Law and excluded
from ‘the people’ who that law is instituted to protect. To put this in the
Kantian terms employed above, those subject to regulatory tools like the
KCPO exist, at least for the duration of their subjection to individualised con-
trol, outside the ‘kingdom of ends’. In the eyes of the relevant legal directives,
they become mere means to support the safety of the ‘true’ body politic.
Needless to say, any society that regulates in this partial and exclusionary
manner cannot claim properly to instantiate the Rule of Law, at least when
the latter concept is understood in terms of civic equality. Rather than
embodying that elevated mode of association, such a society instead persists as
a morally impoverished polity where the equality of each citizen is not funda-
mental but fungible. Wheresoever an individual can be rendered into a means
rather than an end, their equality and legal protections are liable to be sacri-
ficed upon the alter of expediency, through the mechanisms of individualised
127 Zedner (n 124) 80; Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh UP
2004); Andreas Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 123 SALJ 62.
128 David Garland, The Culture of Control (OUP 2001).
129 It should be noted that there are proportionality limits on civil recovery orders; see King and Hendry (n
123).
130 Hendry (n 26) 13. Emphasis in the original.
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control. This, we contend, is the sine qua non of ad hominem criminalisation
and the unenviable position legislative provisions like sections 14 and 21 of
the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 have placed England and Wales in today.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we advanced a novel theory of ad hominem criminalisation
grounded upon a distinct egalitarian conception of the Rule of Law.
Contending that societies subject to government by law are properly under-
stood as instituting civic equality, we argued that this valuable mode of associ-
ation can be undermined by particular types of governmental wrongdoing that
extend beyond more traditionally understood categories, such as arbitrary
punishment. Specifically, we alleged that any regulatory technique that (i)
employs individualised control, (ii) explicitly or implicitly differentiates be-
tween the status of particular individuals or groups and that of society at large
and (iii) instrumentalises the treatment of the former for the benefit of the lat-
ter constitutes an ad hominem legal regime that violates civic equality and
stands in tension with the Rule of Law. Techniques of this kind represent an
aberrant case of legal regulation, in fundamental opposition to the egalitarian
virtues that government by law characteristically possesses.
To illustrate and exemplify this theory, we examined sections 14 and 21 of
the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, which establish the availability of controver-
sial Knife Crime Prevention Orders. These orders, infamously ‘introduced
without proper consultation or a firm evidence base to rely on’,131 establish a
civil/criminal hybrid regime that is paradigmatic of the ad hominem criminalisa-
tion that concerned us here. With a ‘two-step process’132 of individualised
control that fast-tracks those subject to them into becoming punishable by the
criminal law without undertaking criminal activity, KCPOs place a heavy bur-
den upon the state to justify the regulatory asymmetry they create between
those subject to them and those individuals who remain regulated by the ‘or-
dinary’ criminal law. Unfortunately, given the unjust race-, age- and class-
based differentiations that mar the social backdrop to the relevant legislative
provisions,133 no such justification can be mounted. KCPOs both depart from
and exacerbate the extant social prejudices that exist within England and
Wales, creating, in effect, a ‘second class’ of citizen that exists outwith the ‘vir-
tuous majority’ that those orders seek to protect. This ‘dangerous other’—who
131 Logan (n 116).
132 Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, ‘Regulating Offensive Conduct through Two-Step
Prohibitions’ in von Hirsch and Simester, Incivilities (n 104) 173–217.
133 Notably both race and age—alongside disability, gender reassignment, sex, sexual orientation, marriage
and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, and religion or belief—are protected characteristics under the
Equality Act 2010. This observation further supports our assertion that broader sociolegal considerations of
context and background conditions are vital to see beyond mere formal equality.
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is characteristically young, Black, male and poor—is then further alienated by
being instrumentalised as a means to secure the safety of the public at large.
In practical terms, this problematic trifecta of individualised control, wrong-
ful differentiation and exploitative instrumentalisation divests those subject to
KCPOs of important procedural rights and relegates them to a procedurally
hybrid fast track towards criminal punishment. In expressive terms, it effects a
threefold alienation of such individuals from full membership within society,
denies them civic equality as subjects of the law and violates the precept that
the ordinary criminal law should, in principle, be applicable to all. Taken to-
gether, these factors place the issuing of KCPOs in fundamental tension with
the horizontal dimension of legality: that distinct mode of association whereby
government under law transforms a society into a community of equals.
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